Abstract
If we examine the ideal types summarized in Chapter 2, the USA case stands out. It encompasses all four components in varying degrees. The regulatory regime used more openly in the USA than other countries surveyed in this book is a rational risk policy on strict economic grounds. This, highlighted by the OMB’s active involvement in regulatory policy-making in the USA, was an approach first made popular in the Nixon and Ford administrations. Cost-benefit analysis, cost-life analysis, and so on are therefore frequently invoked in the policy-making process. The USA also has a technocratic/expert element branch in regulation. An example of this is the EPA’s Science Advisory Board, which is frequently asked to comment on proposed regulations.1 The US regulatory system also has a well-advanced deliberative component. Initially enshrined in legislation (e.g., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970) which actively encourages public and interest group participation in the policy-making process, it has more recently embraced negotiated rule-making, made law in the 1990 Negotiated Rulemaking Act.
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Notes and References
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© 2005 Ragnar E. Löfstedt
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Löfstedt, R.E. (2005). Risk Management in the United States: The Case of International Paper’s Hydro-Dam Re-Licensing Procedure. In: Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503946_4
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