Abstract
The evidence from the life science laboratories is quite clear: there is going to be an increasing risk that new discoveries will facilitate both state-level offensive biological weapons programmes and sub-state (terrorist) development of biological weapons. For over a decade it has been clear that only a wide-ranging integrated web of policies will be adequate to prevent this misuse of our new scientific and technological capabilities taking place. The web of deterrence1 or web of prevention consists, at the very least, of:
comprehensive, verifiable, global CB arms control to create a risk of detection and a climate of political unacceptability for CB weapons;
broad export monitoring and controls to make it difficult and expensive for a proliferator to obtain necessary materials;
effective CB defensive and protective measures to reduce the military utility of CB weapons; and
a range of determined and effective national and international responses to CB acquisition and/or use.2
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Notes and References
G. S. Pearson, ‘Prospects for chemical and biological arms control: the web of deterrence’, The Washington Quarterly, 16 (2), 1993, 145–62.
M. R. Dando, V. Nathanson and M. Darvell, Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity (London: Harwood Academic, 1999).
S. Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: the CWC Experience, Briefing Paper No.13 (Bradford: University of Bradford, April 2005).
United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction: Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Document BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol.I) (Geneva: United Nations, 26 November 2003).
Ibid., reference 4.
Ibid., reference 4.
Ibid., reference 4.
G. S. Pearson, ‘Security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins’, Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin, 60, 2003, 6–15.
United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction: Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Document BWC/MSP/2004/3 (Geneva: 14 December 2004).
Ibid., reference 9.
United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction: Report of the Meeting of States Parties, Document BWC/MSP/2005/MX/3 (Geneva: United Nations, 5 August 2005).
G. S. Pearson, ‘Report from Geneva No. 23: The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts’, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin, 68, 2005, 12–19.
Ibid., reference 12.
M. R. Dando and B. Rappert, Codes of Conduct for the Life Sciences: Some Insights from UK Academia, Briefing Paper No.16 (Bradford: University of Bradford, May 2005).
Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biology, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003).
J. D. Steinbrunner and E. D. Harris, ‘Controlling dangerous pathogens’, Issues in Science and Technology, 19 (3), 2003, available at: http://www.issues.org/issues/19.3/steinbruner.htm.
M. R. Dando and M. L. Wheelis, ‘Back to bioweapons’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 59 (1), 2003, 40–6.
E. D. Harris and J. D. Steinbrunner, ‘Scientific openness and national security’, Chemical and Biological Conventions Bulletin, 67, 2005, 1–6.
Royal Society, Royal Society Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Policy Document 25/02 (London: Royal Society, 2002).
K. D. Ward, ‘The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure’, The Nonproliferation Review, 11 (2), 2004, 183–99.
US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Proliferation Security Initiative, Washington, DC, 15 September 2003, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24252.pdf.
Ibid.
T. D. Lehrman, ‘Rethinking interdiction: the future of the Proliferation Security Initiative’, The Nonproliferation Review, 11 (2), 2004, 1–45.
Ibid, p.27.
United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th Meeting, on 28 April 2004, available at: http://disarmament2.un.org/Committeel540/Resl540(E).pdf.
Idem.
A more detailed account of the negotiation, content and implications of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 can be found in M. Datan, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540: WMD and non-state traficking’, Disarmament Diplomacy, 79, 2005;
C. Craft, Challenges of UNSCR 1540: Questions about International Export Controls, CITS Briefs (Athens: University of Georgia, 2004).
J. B. Tucker, Biosecurity: Limiting Terrorist Access to Deadly Pathogens, Peaceworks No.52 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, November 2003).
Ibid, p.5.
Ibid, pp.29–34.
See: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/CRIMpreambleFeb04.htm.
Ibid.
See Spence, note 3.
See: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/CRIMpreambleFeb04.htm.
N. A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC: Proposals for the Sixth Review Conference, Review Conference Paper No.12 (Bradford: University of Bradford, March 2005).
Ibid, p.4.
See: http://unfccc.int/2860.php.
See: http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/en/.
M. L. Wheelis, ‘ “Nonlethal” chemical weapons — a Faustian bargain’, Issues in Science and Technology, Spring 2003, 74–8, available at: http://www.issues.org/issues/19.3/wheelis.htm.
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© 2006 Alexander Kelle, Kathryn Nixdorff and Malcolm Dando
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Kelle, A., Nixdorff, K., Dando, M. (2006). Conclusion: Towards an Overarching Framework for Biochemical Controls. In: Controlling Biochemical Weapons. Global Issues Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503496_8
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