Abstract
Many philosophers take exception to Wittgenstein’s bold injunction that ‘we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place’ (PI, §109). In alarming contrast to the endeavours of most contemporary philosophers we are warned that, ’In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. “But it must be like this!” is not a philosophical proposition’ (PI, §599; cf. CV, p. 6e). Philosophers tend to be strongly divided in their views about the worth of this kind of approach. Sometimes it is applauded for its anti-metaphysical virtues, as in Pleasants’ remark below:
Wittgenstein came to relinquish the idea that philosophy could, or should, claim to reveal ‘the way things are’ … I advocate taking entirely seriously the descriptive approach he commends.
(Pleasants 2000, p. 292)
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.
Wittgenstein 1953, §126
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© 2003 Daniel D. Hutto
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Hutto, D.D. (2003). Description Alone. In: Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503205_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503205_7
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