German Foreign Policy in Europe: An Interactionist Framework of Analysis

Abstract

During the 15 years or so since the end of the Cold War and unification, Germany’s policy towards and within the European Union has undergone significant changes. Once the ‘Musterknabe of Europe’ (Le Gloannec, 1998, p. 21), Germany has become increasingly reluctant in supporting the progressive implementation of key projects of European integration. The most recent example is the refusal of the German government to adhere to a strict interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact that empowers the Commission to monitor fiscal discipline. Instead of curbing government spending or accepting an infringement procedure, Germany has managed to build a blocking minority that rendered the Stability and Growth Pact ineffective. This has been a dramatic break with its former policy of imposing fiscal discipline on the members of the euro-area. While at first sight this episode may only provide anecdotal evidence for the claim that Germany’s European policy has changed substantially, it is not without precedence: for instance, since the European Council in Amsterdam in June 1997, Germany has repeatedly vetoed the introduction of majority voting to asylum and refugee policy. This has been an equally striking break with its policy of having justice and home affairs communitarized. As regards security and defence policy, Germany’s position has also changed dramatically. Whereas Germany used to be a vanguard of security and defence integration in the early 1990s, it has lagged behind in implementing the commitments agreed at the European Council in Helsinki and has thereby endangered the success of the entire project.