Weber, Foucault and the Political Sphere

Abstract

There are a number of strong similarities between the work of Max Weber and Michel Foucault. These similarities arise primarily from a shared concern for the impact of cultural rationalization upon ‘the leading of life’ (Lebensführung), or, more precisely, the bearing of instrumental rationality (for Foucault power/knowledge) on individual freedom. This shared concern, as Colin Gordon (1987) has suggested, is apparent in their respective studies of ‘forms of domination and techniques of discipline, their concern with what Weber called “the power of rationality over men”, their writings on methodology and intellectual ethics, their interest in Nietzsche — and the effect of that interest on the critical reception of their thought’ (p. 293).¹ This chapter, while noting these shared interests, will focus, however, on a key point of divergence between Weber and Foucault, namely their contrasting responses to the instrumental rationalism of modern culture. The analysis, in response to the work of David Owen (1994), will centre on the distinction between Weber’s (ascetic) cultural science and Foucault’s (transgressive) genealogical history, and on the distinct political practices to which each gives rise. A comparison will be drawn between the different political ethics advanced by the two theorists, and finally an analysis of the normative basis of their respective works will be pursued.

[T]he historian must … venture forth by lending his or her ear to what is not presentable under the rule of knowledge.

Lyotard (1988c, 57).

[K]nowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting.

Foucault (1977, 154).