Chemical Terrorism

  • Kim Coleman

Abstract

The possibility that terrorists would acquire or use chemical weapons was, of course, around long before a religious cult went on the rampage in Japan in the mid-1990s. This problem had been discussed for decades, mostly behind closed doors among governments, intelligence and law enforcement institutions. A fact quietly acknowledged then, but broadcast now, is that the world is littered with facilities that contain the very materials and expertise from which chemical weapons can be manufactured. Skyscrapers, sporting arenas and transport networks have been accessible terrorist targets for decades as well. Perhaps the dilemma of terrorists obtaining and using chemical weapons did not cause undue anxiety or headlines until the 1990s because no amount of spending could alter those aspects of the threat in the past. The same is true of the present.

Keywords

Rubber Explosive Cyanide Arena Atropine 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Kim Coleman 2005

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  • Kim Coleman

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