Sartrean Existentialism: Extreme Freedom and Groundless Choice

Abstract

The Sartrean view of autonomy is frequently referred to in the literature on autonomy, and it is also referred to as an ideal of autonomy (Hill 1991: 30). I have briefly commented already on Sartre’s view in the first part of this book. However, within the framework of my book and at this point in particular it is appropriate to discuss it again in relation to the problems identified above because, at first sight at least, it seems to provide an attractive alternative to the extended view I have been developing. In this chapter, I will argue that the Sartrean ideal of a free chooser is not only a tempting alternative because it shares much of the stress on independence and (negative) freedom present in the (unextended) modern ideal (as expressed by Berlin, for example) but also it formulates a clear answer to the three problems indicated above. However, I will also offer some compelling reasons why we may not want to adopt Sartre’s view as an ideal of autonomy.