The Economics of Pipeline Routes: The Conundrum of Oil Exports from the Caspian Basin
When the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1991, the Caspian region quickly attained salience in the international arena, focused initially around suspicions that the region housed Persian Gulf sized reserves of oil and gas. The oil industry’s interest in the area dates from the mid-1980s when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev first seriously raised the prospect of foreign investment to develop the vast unexploited riches of the Caspian area. Then in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union rendered the reserves of the newly independent states of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan of immediate interest.
KeywordsTransport Cost Caspian Region Caspian Basin Pipeline Route Bypass Route
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