Abstract
In Chapter 6 I treated the mathematical principles to both a genetic consideration, showing how Kant arrived at them from a treatment of his pre-Critical works, and to a structural justification connecting them to the prior discussion of intuition in the Aesthetic. In this chapter I will treat the dynamical principles in both these respects, showing how they connect to Kant’s discussions of dynamical questions in his “pre-Critical” writings and also how the arguments of the Analogies build on the discussions of the transcendental synthesis of imagination in the Transcendental Deduction and the chapter on schematism.
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Notes
Lorne Falkenstein (2001) “Debate: Langton on Things in Themselves”, Kantian Review, Vol. 5, p. 58. John A. Reuscher (1977) “A Clarification and Critique of Kant’s Principiorum Primorum Cognitionis Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidatio”, Kant-Studien, Vol. 68, p. 30, argues more charitably that Kant is here providing a basis for physics and it is clearly the intent of the demonstration of the Principle of Co-Existence to show a ground for gravity.
Rae Langton (2001) “Reply to Lome Falkenstein”, Kantian Review, Vol. 5, p. 71.
Paton (1936, Vol. 2, pp. 207–9), where Paton provides some tentative reasons for rejecting the equation of this principle with Newton’s. Strawson (1966) comments in lapidary fashion that “the arguments for the Principles can, in a number of cases, be reasonably viewed as fundamental assumptions of physical theory as it existed in Kant’s day” subsequently making clear he means Newtonian assumptions (pp. 118–19). For an interpretation of the argument of the First Analogy in accord with this view, see Carl Friedrich V. Weizsäcker (1971) “Kant’s ‘First Analogy of Experience’ and Conservation Principles of Physics”, Synthese, Vol. 23. Kant treats Newton’s three laws in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (Ak. 4: 542–7) and the connection between them and the Analogies would require lengthy treatment, not in my view on the lines suggested by Strawson and Weizsäcker.
Paton (1936, Vol. 2, p. 196): “Kant is asking how there can be any durations for us to measure.” That duration is noticeable at all refers us to transcendental conditions not how one change is measured relatively to a different change but what it is that enables us to say that there is any change. The direct contrary of this view is stated by Arthur Melnick (1973) Kant’s Analogies of Experience, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, who writes: “The First Analogy is concerned with the determination of time magnitude; i.e., with determining (measuring) time intervals” (p. 60).
Jonathan Bennett (1966) Kant’s Analytic, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 182–4.
Steven M. Bayne (2004) Kant on Causation: On the Fivefold Routes to the Principle of Causation, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 33.
Graham Bird (1962) Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the “Critique of Pure Reason”, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and New York: Humanities Press, p. 165.
My view here is close to that of Margaret Morrison who, in her important article on the Third Analogy, states the following: “What the third analogy provides is the unified spatial structure that allows to locate matter (substance) in space and to experience motion through a continuous space. Each of the relational categories/principles is concerned with a specific kind of time determination; what makes the third analogy different is that the temporal feature (simultaneity and coexistence) cannot be achieved without the accompanying spatial component. In other words, we cannot conceive of two substances existing at the same time unless they are in different regions of space.” Margaret Morrison (1998) “Community and Coexistence: Kant’s Third Analogy of Experience”, Kant-Studien, Vol. 89, p. 272. What Morrison does not point out but which has been a point we have returned to again and again is the co-determination of time and space. Just as space is the only form in which time can be represented so is temporal order here shown to be necessary for the conception of spatial position.
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© 2005 Gary Banham
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Banham, G. (2005). Substance, Causality and Community. In: Kant’s Transcendental Imagination. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501195_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501195_7
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