Abstract
Having reached a statement of the fundamental problems of Kant’s practical philosophy from considering the Lectures on Ethics it is now time to set out the considerations of practical import that are presented in the Critique or Pure Reason. This is necessary due to the fact that the consideration of freedom within the First Critique adds a further element of difficulty in the comprehension of Kant’s practical philosophy, an element that will guide the consideration of the relationship between the Groundwork and the Second Critique. It is within the pages of the First Critique that Kant sets out a distinction between two types of freedom: practical freedom and transcendental freedom. It will be necessary in this chapter to attend to the question of how Kant understands these types of freedom to be related and to give a description of the characterizations he provides of each.
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© 2003 Gary Banham
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Banham, G. (2003). Freedom and the Ends of Reason. In: Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501188_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230501188_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-4039-8987-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-50118-8
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