Brezhnev and Superpower Relations

Abstract

During his eighteen years as General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev’s one major policy innovation was détente, the relaxation of tensions with the West (razryadka napryazhennosti). In some respects, détente was simply a continuation of Khrushchev’s thaw. For despite times of high tension, under Khrushchev East—West relations had generally improved, as evidenced by the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the installation of the Hotline between the Kremlin and the White House in 1963. Brezhnev’s détente, however, differed in two fundamental ways from the earlier thaw. First, détente was more comprehensive and wide-ranging in its aims. Over two dozen treaties were signed by the two superpowers in the 1970s, including agreements on arms control, crisis prevention, crisis management, East—West trade, European security and even human rights. Second, Brezhnev’s détente was based on essential military equivalence between the two superpowers. When Khrushchev was removed from office by his colleagues in October 1964, he was accused of bluff and bluster involving, amongst other things, `imprudent and indiscreet conduct of foreign affairs’.¹ Embarrassing climbdowns over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 clearly indicated that Khrushchev’s rhetoric had run far ahead of Soviet capability. Therefore, Brezhnev’s main aim was to add greater substance to Moscow’s claims to being a superpower, and to do this he believed it was necessary to build up Soviet military power.