New Standards of Accountability

  • Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


The third element of the new accountability agenda is the emergence of a new set of standards against which power-holders are judged. A shift in standards is to some degree implicit in the trends reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. When actors in accountability relationships assume new roles, when they reach across old accountability jurisdictions or create new ones, when they use new methods to either demand answers of power-holders or trigger enforcement processes — under such circumstances the criteria used to assess the performance of accountability targets are bound to shift.


Child Labour Female Genital Mutilation Procedural Fairness Accountability System Truth Commission 
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© Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins

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