Accountability Failures and Human Development

  • Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

As we argued in Chapter 2, corruption is not the only reason why accountability institutions fail to protect the poor. The very nature of democratic representation means that elections cannot possibly deliver fully on the popular expectation that bad governance will be punished at the ballot box. Moreover, accountability failures that particularly afflict the poor stem from elite ‘biases’ as well as from elite ‘capture’.

Keywords

Arsenic Arena Malaysia Egypt Argentina 

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins

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