Abstract
As we argued in Chapter 2, corruption is not the only reason why accountability institutions fail to protect the poor. The very nature of democratic representation means that elections cannot possibly deliver fully on the popular expectation that bad governance will be punished at the ballot box. Moreover, accountability failures that particularly afflict the poor stem from elite ‘biases’ as well as from elite ‘capture’.
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© 2005 Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins
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Goetz, A.M., Jenkins, R. (2005). Accountability Failures and Human Development. In: Reinventing Accountability. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230500143_3
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