• Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)


Accountability is a perpetual struggle when power is delegated by the many to the few in the interests of governability. To complicate matters further, in most systems of government the task of holding accountable those to whom power has been delegated is itself delegated — again, to a relatively small number of individuals: senior judges, auditors-general, members of legislative public accounts committees. The question of who will watch the watchdog is as old as it is unavoidable.


Powerful Actor Ordinary People Accountability System Democratic Accountability Democratic Deficit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins 2005

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  • Anne Marie Goetz
  • Rob Jenkins

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