Abstract
Accountability is a perpetual struggle when power is delegated by the many to the few in the interests of governability. To complicate matters further, in most systems of government the task of holding accountable those to whom power has been delegated is itself delegated — again, to a relatively small number of individuals: senior judges, auditors-general, members of legislative public accounts committees. The question of who will watch the watchdog is as old as it is unavoidable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 78.
Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 3 (1999).
The basic components of this definition are drawn from Andreas Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in A. Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 14–17.
Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 55–69.
Robert S. Barker, ‘Government Accountability and its Limits’, Issues of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 2 (2000).
The study of financial regulation in the south includes similar attention to sequencing and periodization. Brownbridge, for instance, argues that a reform priority should be introducing ‘prompt corrective action rules’ for banks that fail to meet prudential norms, lest the exposure of a few risk the well-being of the many. This, it was felt, would help by ‘enhancing the regulators’ independence from political interference in operational issues’, while still ‘making them more accountable ex-post’. M. Brownbridge, ‘Policy Lessons for Prudential Regulation in Developing Countries’, Development Policy Review, vol. 20, no. 3 (2002), pp. 305–16.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘Is Electoral and Institutional Reform the Answer?’ Seminar 506 (’Reforming Politics: A Symposium on Rethinking Democratic Institutions and Practice’), October 2001.
Harry Blair, ‘Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries’, World Development, vol. 28, no. 1 (2000), p. 24.
John Lonsdale, ‘Political Accountability in African History’, in Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 126–87.
In many developing countries dual legal systems give customary and religious law dominion over certain social affairs, most typically familial relationships (marriage, inheritance, child custody) and the use of common property (such as tribal lands). Such systems tend to lock less powerful plaintiffs into legal forums where they have reduced rights, allowing more powerful plaintiffs or defendants to ‘forum-shop to find an avenue for evading a duty’. Doris M. Martin, ‘Women in Development: The Legal Issues in Sub-Saharan Africa Today’, Working Paper No. 4, Poverty and Social Policy Division, Africa Region (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992), p. 17.
Copyright information
© 2005 Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Goetz, A.M., Jenkins, R. (2005). Introduction. In: Reinventing Accountability. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230500143_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230500143_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51012-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-50014-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)