Abstract
Power is the cornerstone of Chinese politics. Chinese politicians and diplomats are often recognised as masters of power politics, having inherited a well-spring of experience of power play over the millenniums.2 Chinese society is organised in a hierarchical order, more so in traditional China than in modern times, with codes of conduct regulating personal relationships within an extended family, as well as among one’s peers, and in relation to one’s juniors and seniors. Even ordinary Chinese realise the importance of power and exercise it in their daily lives. The Chinese understanding of the concept of power is close to the Western orthodox meaning of power as ‘an authoritative allocation of values’ or ‘who gets what, when and how’. The exercise of power, however, differs substantially (see Chapter 5).
Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.
(Mao Zedong)
Power can be attained through controlling powerful institutions.
(Jiang Zemin)1
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Notes
Quoted in Asiaweek, Hong Kong, 29 August 1997, p. 8.
See, for example, Dennis and Ching Ping Bloodworth, The Chinese Machiavelli: 3,000 Years of Chinese Statecraft (New York: Dell, 1976).
Better understood as ‘School of Law’ (Fajia), in which law, in the Western understanding of the term, is not the central concept of the School. See A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), p. 268.
However, Arthur Waldron is of the opinion that ‘the 2,000-year debate between ru (Confucianism) and fa (Legalism)... continues today, both in scholarship and in the practical politics of China’. See his book review of Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), in The China Quarterly, No. 147 (September 1996), p. 964.
Enlarged from 20 to 22 members in the 15th Party Congress held in September 1997. See The Dominion, Wellington, 29 September 1997, p. 4.
See Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, pp. 117, 119, and 121.
Liu Zhonghai, ‘Zhilun shijie zhuyao guojia de zonghe guoli [A discussion of the comprehensive national power of some important countries in the world]’, Tongji yu juece [Statistics and Policy-making], Wuhan, No. 5 (1989), p. 25.
Wang Shuofeng, ‘Mantan zonghe guoli [A survey of comprehensive national power]’, Shijie zhishi [World Knowledge], Beijing, No. 24 (1987), p. 13. See also his Zonghe guoli lun [On Comprehensive National Power] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1992).
Liu Wenxiang, ‘Deng Xiaoping dui woguo guoji guanxi de fazhan [Deng Xiaoping’s theoretical development of China’s international relationship]’, Journal of Hubei University, philosophy and social sciences edn, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1994), p. 114.
Wang Shuofeng, ‘Zonghe guolilun [An analysis of comprehensive national power]’, Baike zhishi [Encyclopaedic Knowledge], Beijing, No. 6 (1989), p. 7.
Jin Yingzhong and Ni Shixiong, Guoji guanxi lilun bijiao yanjiu [A Comparative Study of International Relations Theory] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 1992), p. 164.
Ibid., pp. 166–7.
Dong Xiuling, ‘Zonghe guoli lilun yanjiu zongshu [A discussion of the theoretical study of comprehensive national power]’, Xueshu yanjiu dongtai [Developments in Academic Studies], Nanjing, No. 9 (1991), p. 5.
Another study points out that from 1976 to 1996, China’s CNP remained in the tenth position. See a book review of Wang Songfeng et al., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu [A Comparative Study of the Comprehensive Power of the World’s Major Countries] (Hunan chubanshe, 1996), in World Economics and Politics, No. 5 (1997), p. 80.
The Project Group of Comparative Study of National Comprehensive Strength, Institute of World Economics and Politics, CASS, ‘Dui Zhongguo zonghe guoli de cedu he yiban fenxi [The measure and general analysis of China’s comprehensive strength]’, Zhongguo shehui kexue [Social Sciences in China], No. 5 (September 1995), pp. 4–19. There are also other, less extensive studies of this nature, for example: ‘Wuguo zonghe guoli bijiao yu yuce [Comparing and predicting the comprehensive powers of five countries]’, Zhongguo guoqing guoli [China’s National Conditions and Power], Beijing, No. 3 (1995), pp. 43 ff.
‘The measure and general analysis of China’s comprehensive strength’, p. 4.
Zhou Zhixian and Chen Qida, ‘Guanyu Zhongguo guojia liliang de jidian kanfa [Some views on China’s national strength]’, Contemporary International Relations, No. 3 (1993), p. 6.
Yan Shengyi, ‘Guoji chongtu de zhuyao kunyuan shi guojia liyi de chongtu [The source of international confrontation: conflict of national interest]’, International Survey, No. 5 (1994), p. 21.
Li Yiping, ‘Zhongguo de guoqing yu Zhongguo de gaige [China’s conditions and China’s reform]’, China’s National Conditions and Power, No. 5 (1995), pp. 9–11.
Wu Jiangong, ‘Lun junshi zai guoji guanxi zhong de diwai [The role of the balance of power in international relations]’, Hunan Shifan Daxue shehui kexue xuebao [Journal of Social Sciences of Hunan Normal University], additional edn (1993), p. 1.
Liu Ming, ‘Dui “weilai guoji zhengzhi chongtu moshi” de jidian sikao [Some thoughts on the “model of international political conflict”]’, Shehui kexue [Social Sciences], Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, No. 10 (1994), p. 28.
Fuyin baokan ziliao [Reprints of Materials from Newspapers and Journals], D7: international politics, No. 8 (1994), p. 13.
Mao quoted an old Chinese strategic move called yuanjiao jingong (befriend the distant [state], attack the near [state]) in assessing China’s relations with neighbouring countries. See Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, pp. 494–5.
Wu, ‘The role of the balance of power in international relations’, p. 1.
Ling Su, ‘Lun guoji guanxi zhong de junshi wenti [The question of balance of power in international relations]’, Beijing Daxue xuebao [Journal of Peking University], philosophy and social sciences edn, No. 3, in Reprints of Materials from Newspapers and Journals, D7, No. 7 (1986), p. 32.
Ni Shixiong and Wang Guoming, ‘Junshi lilun zenghengtan [An analysis of the theory of balance of power]’, Zhengzhixue yanjiu [Study of Politics], Beijing, No. 3 (1986), p. 5.
Bleiker, ‘Neorealist claims in light of ancient Chinese philosophy: the cultural dimension of international theory’, p. 406.
Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. 3 (1982–92) (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994), p. 358.
According to China’s 1995 sample survey of I% of its population, there are 145 million illiterates over the age of 15, of whom 70% are women and 37.55 million are between the ages of 15 and 45. About 90% of China’s illiterate people live in the countryside. See China Today, September 1997, p. 28.
For recent examples, see Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, ‘The coming conflict with America’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 18–32; Denny Roy, ‘The “China threat” issue: major arguments’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996), pp. 758–71; and Gary Klintworth and Des Ball, ‘China’s arms buildup and regional security’, in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (eds), China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Melbourne: Longman; New York: St Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 258–83. A Chinese official source traces the origin of this ‘China threat’ theory to an article entitled ‘On the potential threat of China’, published by Tomohide Murai, a professor at the Defense University in Tokyo in the monthly Shokun (August 1990). See Beijing Review, 14–20 July 1997, p. 7. Robert S. Ross of Boston College and Harvard University has consistently refuted the ‘China threat’ thesis. See his ‘Beijing as a conservative power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33–44.
The chairman of the commitee, Senator Richard Shelby, said no other country posed ‘such risks, such opportunities and such dilemma’ as China. See The Dominion, 20 September 1997, p. 4.
Wang Yunxiang, “Zhongguo weixie lun” xi [An analysis of the “China threat thesis”]’, International Survey, No. 3 (1996), pp. 35–40.
Yan Xuetong, a research fellow at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing with a doctoral degree in politics from the University of California, Berkeley, suggests that the United States is seemingly suffering from an ‘enemy-deficiency syndrome’ and warns of dangers of neo-McCarthyism. See Beijing Review, 7–13 July 1997, pp. 7–8.
Ge Yang, ‘China rise: threat or not?’ Beijing Review, 30 January to 5 February 1995, pp. 23–5.
29 January to 4 February 1996, p. 11.
Ge, ‘China rise: threat or not?’ p. 24.
China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information Office, State Council, 1995). The full report can also be found in Beijing Review, 27 November to 3 December 1995, pp. 10–25.
Zhao Suisheng on BBC news broadcast in Chinese, received in Hong Kong on 19 November 1995.
Such as refitting commercial cargo ships for naval transport. See Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 June 1997, p. 32.
Bernstein and Munro, ‘The coming conflict with America’, pp. 24–5.
Inside China Mainland, Taipei, January 1996, p. 31; Beijing Review, 27 November to 3 December 1995, p. 14.
See Asian Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1997, p. 1. According to Asia Times, the Chinese streamlining of its army aims to make it more professional and to separate the fighting force from the army’s vast business empire consisting of about 20 000 enterprises which are supposed to contribute over a third of their profit to subsidise the military budget. See Asia Times, 21 January 1997, p. 1.
[Taiwanese] Ministry of Defence (ed.), Guofang baogaoshu [National Defence Report] (Taipei: Liming Cultural Co., 1992), 271 pp. For a review of this report, see Gerald Chan in New Zealand Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (June 1993), pp. 167–70.
Frank Ching in Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 November 1995, p. 38.
Zhao Xiaochun in Journal of the Institute of International Relations, No. 2 (1995), p. 13.
For example, Lieutenant-General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the People’s Liberation Army, led a delegation to the South Pacific to explain China’s defence policy. He gave a seminar on the topic on 7 May 1996 at Victoria University of Wellington. See Bulletin, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand, No. 7 (September 1996), pp. 1–2.
Deng Xiaoping spelt out some of his fears of China losing its indepedence in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, p. 311. In fact, Yang Chengxu, president of the China Institute for International Studies, pointed out in a symposium held in Beijing in early 1997 that ‘the United States sought to reinforce its military alliance with Japan and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region in an apparent attempt to contain both Russia and China’. See Beijing Review, 27 January to 2 February 1997, p. 7.
Mohan Malik’s speech at a defence conference in Australia. See The Dominion, 2 December 1996, p. 16.
Quoted in Asiaweek, 1 August 1997, p. 37.
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© 1999 Gerald Chan
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Chan, G. (1999). Power: The Centrepiece. In: Chinese Perspectives on International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230390201_3
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