Conclusion

Abstract

The aim of this book has been to show that pluralism is a viable and plausible philosophical interpretation of religion. In this section we review the strength of the case offered for these conclusions. Pluralism’s viability and plausibility depend in part on two matters so far not discussed at length in these pages: the overall interpretation of religious life offered by pluralism and the impact of pluralism on first-order engagement with the faiths. The second section of this chapter takes up these two remaining issues. The three defining theses of our version of pluralism are as follows. (1) All major religious traditions are equal in respect of making common reference to a single, transcendent reality. (2) All major traditions are likewise equal in respect of offering some means or other to human salvation. (3) All major traditions are to be seen as containing revisable, limited accounts of the nature of this reality: none is certain enough in its dogmatic formulations to provide the norm for interpreting the others.