Abstract
Much of traditional economic theory is predicated on the proposition that individual self-interest, operating through the self-regulating market mechanism and guided as if by an Invisible Hand, has the welcome if unintended function of significantly advancing the economic welfare of the community. It was clearly this beneficence of outcome which Adam Smith had in mind when he spoke as follows of the appeal to what many would undoubtedly castigate as mean rapacity: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.’1 Mean rapacity it may be, but the fact remains that filthy pigs can and do produce better ham than may reasonably be expected from, let us say, the polished elegance of the Angora cat: ‘The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations.’2
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Notes and References
A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776), ed. by E. Cannan (London: Methuen, 1961), Vol. I, p. 18.
See, for example, P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 203–53 and his ‘Social Indifference Curves’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 70, 1956, pp. 1–22.
K. E. Boulding, ‘Economics as a Moral Science’, American Economic Review, Vol. 59, 1969, p. 8. Note also Boulding’s reminder (ibid., p. 10) that the economic mode at times breeds and forms some very unpleasant character-traits indeed: ‘No one in his senses would want his daughter to marry an economic man, one who counted every cost and asked for every reward, was never afflicted with mad generosity or uncalculating love, and who never acted out of a sense of inner identity and indeed had no inner identity even if he was occasionally affected by carefully calculated considerations of benevolence or malevolence. ‘ Boulding’s observation is a salutary corrective to the approach of ‘economics imperialism’ which he is criticising. It is important to remember, however, that there is a clear distinction to be made between discouraging one’s daughter from marrying an economic man and refusing oneself to enter into a trading relationship with such an individual; and that even Boulding would appear to assign pride of place to economic man in specifically economic affairs, narrowly defined.
J. A. Schumpeter, Captialism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), p. 287.
B. Frey, Modern Political Economy (London: Martin Robertson, 1978) pp. 5, 6. Since Frey says there is ‘little evidence’ for believing A, it is not clear why he says ‘it must rather be assumed’ with respect to B.
G. Tullock, The Vote Motive (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1976) pp. 5, 25.
C. B. Macpherson, ‘Market Concepts in Political Theory’, in his Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 189.
J. F. J. Toye, ‘Economic Theories of Politics and Public Finance’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6, 1976, p. 434.
J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 306.
A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (ETD) (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 27.
G. Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 65.
Jo Grimond, in J. M. Buchanan et al, The Economics of Politics (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), p. 66.
W. Rodgers, ‘The Political Process: Market Place or Battleground?’, in R. C. O. Matthews (ed. ), Economy and Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 117.
J. Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 149, 153.
B. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 127.
A. Downs, ‘Why The Government Budget Is Too Small In A Democracy’, World Politics, Vol. 12, 1960, p. 541. This paper may also be found in an abridged form in
E. S. Phelps (ed.), Private Wants and Public Needs, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965).
K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), p. x.
A. Smithies, ‘Optimum Location in Spatial Competition’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49. 1941, p. 423.
D. Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 113.
A. Downs, ‘In Defense of Majority Voting’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69. 1961, p. 195.
G. Tullock, ‘Reply to a Traditionalist’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 69. 1961, p. 203.
A. Bergson, ‘On the Concept of Social Welfare’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 68, 1954, p. 239.
W. Nordhaus, ‘The Political Business Cycle’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 42, 1975, p. 184.
M. Olson, ‘Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector’, in M. Moss (ed. ), The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1973), p. 358.
See on this Buchanan and Tullock, op. cit., The Calculus of Consent, Chapter 10, and D. A. Reisman, The Political Economy of James Buchanan (London: Macmillan, 1989), Chapter 4.
G. Tullock, Towards a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 118.
H. G. Johnson, ‘The Economic Approach to Social Questions’, Economica, Vol. 35, 1968, p. 12.
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© 1990 David Reisman
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Reisman, D. (1990). Democracy and Consent. In: Theories of Collective Action. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389977_2
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