Abstract
Historically, strategic overstretch has generally only been recognized after the fact. An intentional overextension would tend to run counter to any notion of rational behavior. In almost every other case of strategic overstretch, it took a major war to force a state to reduce its commitments. In the case of the USSR, however, it wasn’t a global armed conflict but rather a change within the domestic political system that led the Soviet leadership to realize that they had overextended themselves in their Cold War against the United States.
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© 1996 David Cox
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Cox, D. (1996). The Beginnings of Disengagement. In: Retreating from the Cold War. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389939_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389939_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39598-9
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-38993-9
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