Abstract
Suppose someone claims that an individual who is known to have died, Sir Winston Churchill for instance, in fact survived his bodily death and now exists as a discarnate spirit. One of the first puzzles that this claim would produce is this. How can a spirit which has no body, and therefore no physical characteristics whatsoever, possibly be one and the same person as the historical, flesh-and-blood Winston Churchill? Even understanding this claim may be a matter of some difficulty.
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Notes and References
See for example, G. Madell, The Identity of the Self (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981);
D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984);
S. Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963);
B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) p. 262.
See J. Hick, ‘Theology and Verification’, in J. Hick (ed.), The Existence of God (London and New York: Macmillan, 1974).
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© 1995 R. W. K. Paterson
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Paterson, R.K.W. (1995). Problems of Post-Mortem Identity. In: Philosophy and the Belief in a Life After Death. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389885_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230389885_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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