Conclusion

Abstract

Despite an illusion of strength, by the end of 1942 the Chetniks were in a state of some crisis. This was probably not readily apparent to Mihailovic or the majority of his subordinates, but it was nonetheless true. Similarly, the latter’s declaration of continued support for King Peter’s Minister of War was, in reality, no more than a facade, not only because it attempted to conceal the internal disagreements which were coming to bedevil British policy, but also because it remained conditional on positive reports being received from Colonel Bailey, and because it was in itself based on a fundamental misevaluation of the nature, capabilities and objectives of the Yugoslav resistance movements. Indeed, although the British entered 1943 with a commitment to Mihailovic which was superficially as strong as that made in late 1941, nearly all of the factors which were to lead to their eventual break with the General — his supposed unwillingness to attack the Germans and Italians, his concomitant determination to regard other Yugoslavs, among them those who were fighting the Axis, as his main enemies, and the accommodations between his followers and the occupying forces - were already present.