The Special Operations Executive (SOE), the Yugoslavs and European Resistance

Abstract

British strategy in 1939 had been based on the belief that Britain could not provide a large army to fight on the continent; instead, she would make her contribution in other areas. Of these, one of the most significant was a rather nebulous but nonetheless important aspect of strategy known as economic warfare. This idea was originally based on the belief that Germany’s ultimate defeat in the First World War had been due to the success of blockade, and during the 1930s it had been expanded to include such other means of pressure as strategic bombing, sabotage and psychological warfare. By the outbreak of the Second World War the theory had become highly attractive to many and, in the opinion of one commentator, was seen as ‘the primary instrument of war’ and ‘the mainstay of official strategy’. This position could only be reinforced as Britain’s European allies were overrun, for without their armies there was little choice other than to adopt unconventional methods of waging war.