The Limits of British Influence

Abstract

MacmiUan’s visit to Moscow left him in a difficult position with his main alUes. None had supported his decision to go and all were suspicious about what had transpired. He beUeved that Khrushchev’s withdrawal of his deadUne and the Soviets’ wiUingness to attend a foreign ministers’ conference, in advance of a fuU summit, provided an opportunity that should not be missed. The problem was to convince his sceptical allies that nothing sinister had happened in Moscow and that the time was right for negotiations to begin. The goal was to secure a summit meeting, where Macmillan hoped a deal could be struck. The foreign ministers’ conference was merely a stage to this end and his strategy was to convince the Americans and French of the need for direct contact with the Russians, whilst retaining a leading role for Britain and himself ahead of the British election. But his attempts to reassure his allies failed: de GauUe was ambivalent but determined broadly to support Adenauer; the chancellor was incensed by a reference to what he believed was disengagement in the final communique from Moscow; and Eisenhower, preoccupied with Dulles’s worsening illness, proved immune to Macmillan’s blandishments. More to the point, the president had begun to consider his own, individual initiative, which was to have profound implications for MacmiUan’s whole foreign policy and election strategy.