The Deadline Crisis

Abstract

Khrushchev’s attack on the West’s presence in Berlin in the autumn of 1958 caught the Western alliance by surprise, despite an on-going series of disputes. Anglo-German relations were in a delicate state over the EEC-EFTA question, with the British government unsure how to support Adenauer against an external Soviet threat at a time when it was unhappy with him on trade matters. Khrushchev’s initial threat to turn over the control functions in Berlin to the DDR caused confusion in Western capitals. The British, predisposed towards compromise, quickly settled on the possibility of recognising the East German regime as a price worth paying for a Berlin settlement, to the dismay of their main allies. The debate over how to respond to Khrushchev saw little agreement, either militarily or politically, among the three allied occupying powers and the FRG, but Britain was singled out as the weakest link and accused of defeatism. This resulted from an ill-conceived decision by the Foreign Office to present the problem as a stark choice between compromising on dealing with the East German regime, or preparing for war. Although this reflected concerns shared by a number of Western countries, Britain’s policy of emphasising the extent to which the West was powerless to stop Khrushchev damaged Anglo-German relations and set the tone for the entire Berlin crisis.