An International Bill of Human Rights

Abstract

The Second World War provided the catalyst that led to calls for a new normative order, morally binding on all states and going beyond narrowly defined self-interest. Those planning for this new order came to accept that human suffering could be both a reaction to, and a cause of, political, social and economic chaos.¹ Human rights therefore became a central concern during the discussions to establish new institutions with the task of ensuring that the brutality of fascism would never emerge again. In effect this meant cooperation in all areas of political, social and economic life, including the development of new organisations to support and promote new postwar values. But new organisations could be constructed and supported only through the energy, resources, economic power and expertise of states that emerged from the war relatively unscathed. Since the United States was the only major power to be in this position it assumed the dominant role in determining the character of the new order. Consequently, the United States was well placed to promote those elements that supported its new hegemonic role while excluding those that appeared to offer a threat. From the early 1960s, particularly in the wake of rapid decolonisation, the legal, economic, political and cultural practices and principles established at the UN received increasing criticism from less developed countries. However, during the earlier period, dating from the end of the war until the mid-1950s, American and western values predominated.² The norms of the human rights regime were negotiated during this earlier period.