Stalin’s Final Solution

Abstract

On 5 December, a Politburo commission on collectivization was established under Yakovlev, the head of Narkomzem USSR, and included regional representatives. Two main subcommissions were formed within it: one on rates of collectivization, headed by Kaminsky, and another on the kulak question, headed by Bauman.¹ Ostensibly, the key function of the commission was to draw up workable plans of collectivization for the regions but, in reality, its work was framed within a background of wholly inadequate preparations for the success of comprehensive collectivization. Perhaps the most striking indication of the failure of the Politburo’s forward planning was that a decision to sharply increase tractor production in the country came as late as 5 November 1929, on the eve of comprehensive collectivization. The Supreme Council of the National Economy (USSR) was ordered to increase projected production targets from 15,000 to 20,000 units in Leningrad’s Putilov Works in 1930-31, from 40,000 to 50,000 in the Stalingrad tractor plant, while the output of the Chelyabinsk tractor plant was to soar from 1,500 units in 1930–31 to 30,000 in 1931–32. The crucial point about these projected production targets is that the kolkhoz sector would not receive large-scale tractor deliveries for at least another year — after the 1930 season.