Skip to main content

In Fear of Reaction: Restraining the Rise of a Far Right

  • Chapter
Politics after Hitler

Part of the book series: Studies in Modern History ((SMH))

  • 29 Accesses

Abstract

We could make no greater mistake in trying to judge the significance of the occupation of Germany than to overlook the immediate context of war from which it developed. The occupation formed more than the first stage of what we only later came to call the Cold War, and it was more than simply the beginning of the history of a new Germany. It was also the last act of the Second World War; the occupiers had no choice but to view it primarily as the culmination of battlefield conflict. Some statistics assuredly in the front of the minds of Germany’s conquerors can point to the importance of this proposition. In addition to much of its national honor, the war cost the French the lives of over 210 000 soldiers and of more than 400 000 civilians. Its industrial output in 1945 was only 29 percent of 1938’s levels, and 700 000 French citizens had done forced labor in German industries.4 Britain lost what remained of its pre-1914 dominance in world finance and trade, in addition to 264 000 battlefield and 92,000 civilian deaths. The United States spent the then unimaginable sum of over $300 000 000 000 to bring Nazi Germany and the Imperial Japanese to surrender, in addition to suffering 405 000 military deaths.5

The goal…is the creation of a unified large party of the right, in which all conservative, Christian and nationally-oriented Germans can find their political home.

(Self-proclaimed goal of the newly unified German Conservative Party-German Right Party, March 1946)1

The intention is…to ban any man who held, in the past, “poisonous opinions,” e.g., was a propagator of anti Semitism, extreme nationalism or at any date helped the Nazis in their rise to power.

(British officials in Germany informing their superiors of their policy towards the German right, May 1946)2

It is recommended that this party be dissolved and that wide publicity be presented in the licensed press and on the radio in explanation, so that future attempts by undesirable reactionary elements to form political parties or to gain representation in established parties may be more difficult.

(American military government intelligence official, recommending the National Democratic Party be banned in the U.S. zone, February 1946)3

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. Jean-Pierre Rioux, La France de la IVe République vol. 1, L’ardeur et la nécessité, 1944–1952 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), 26, 36.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Klemens von Klemperer, Germany’s New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), 21–31.

    Google Scholar 

  3. On the social revolution, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Anchor, 1969), 395

    Google Scholar 

  4. David Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1966)

    Google Scholar 

  5. David Schoenbaum, and Peter Katzenstein, “Problem or Model? West Germany in the 1980s,” World Politics 32 (1980), 577–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. On this, see Charles S. Maier, ‘The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe,’ American Historical Review 86 (1981), 330.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See Horst W. Schmollinger, “Die Nationaldemokratische Partei,” in Stöss, ed., Parteien-Handbuch, 1892

    Google Scholar 

  8. Rand Charles Lewis, A Nazi Legacy: Right-Wing Extremism in Postwar Germany (New York: Praeger, 1991), 46–47

    Google Scholar 

  9. Rand Charles Lewis,and Richard Stöss, Die extreme Rechte in der Bundesrepublik: Entwicklung, Ursachen, Gegenmaßnahmen (Cologne: Westdeutscher, 1989), 104.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Ossip K. Flechtheim, ed., Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945 (Berlin: Wendler, 1962), 2:376.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 1945–1953 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), 26.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 1995 Daniel E. Rogers

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rogers, D.E. (1995). In Fear of Reaction: Restraining the Rise of a Far Right. In: Politics after Hitler. Studies in Modern History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379954_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379954_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39359-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37995-4

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics