Lyotard

Abstract

The conclusion of Chapter 1 is that the suggested alternative to even attempting to consider whether the professor is objectively entitled to a drink, whether he is ‘really’ thirsty, etc., is to instead reflect on whether his performance at the seminar justifies a drink. In general, then, we are proposing substituting for Habermas’s interest in searching for what it would in various senses be correct to do, searching instead for what it would be just to do. However, reorienting the problem in this way, away from, at least according to certain definitions, an interest in truth and, even by our own admission, away from a criterion which would even lead to the rational hope of universal agreement, raises a question. In abandoning an interest in objective truth, how are we not just abandoning any rational standard? That is, how is an interest in seminars that will deserve or justify drinks different from being prepared to do whatever will enable one to be successful in obtaining a drink? In other words, will a method designed to liberate us from impossible standards for deciding what is right, good to do, etc. just lead to a total corruption of standards so that we would come to identify even something like a good seminar with one which enabled the professor to gain some immediate desire?