Abstract
The strategic debates of the 1970s within the United States were as passionate as any that had gone before. After some delay, a challenge was mounted to the concepts developed during the McNamara period, in particular the notion of mutual assured destruction. Although an impressive critique was developed, attempts to create a compelling alternative were less successful. As confidence that a nuclear war could and would be fought in a specific way waned, the argument came to be heard that it was necessary to prepare to fight in almost any way. As uncertainty grew as to what dimension of military power created the desired deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, it was argued that imposing strength must be demonstrated on every dimension.
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Notes
Richard L. Garwin and Hans Bethe, ‘Anti-ballistic missile systems’, Scientific American (March 1968). Reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 164.
Abram Chayes, Jerome Wiesner, George Rathjens, and Steven Weinberg, ‘An overview’, in Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner (ed.), ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 58–9. This was the key anti-ABM document.
‘It is my contention that with minor exceptions, the United States has led in the development of military technology and weapons production throughout the Cold War…. This … has placed the United States in a position of being fundamentally responsible for every major escalation of the arms race.’ Edgar Bottome, The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. xv–xvi.
George Rathjens, ‘The dynamics of the arms race’, Scientific American (April 1969). Reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 187.
Quoted in Nancy Lipton and Leonard Rodberg, ‘The missile race: the contest with ourselves’, in Leonard Rodberg and Derek Shearer, The Pentagon Watchers (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1970), p. 303.
Herbert York, ‘Military technology and national security’, in Scientific American (August 1969) reprinted in York (ed.), Arms Control, p. 198. York developed his views in Race to Oblivion.
Some of the better works of this genre are: Ralph Lapp, The Weapons Culture (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968);
Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Richard Kaufman, The War Profiteers (New York: Doubleday, 1972). To gain the flavour of the 1969 fervour on this matter and the general strategic views of the critics, see the report of a conference organised by The Progressive magazine involving Congressmen and a sundry collection of critics.
Published as Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (eds.), American Militarism 1970 (New York: The Viking Press, 1969).
For example, Sam Sarkesian (ed.), The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications: 1972).
The best of the studies in Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1975).
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), pp. 202–3.
Quoted in Desmond Ball, Déjà Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration (California: Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, 1974), p. 8.
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© 2003 Lawrence Freedman
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Freedman, L. (2003). Military-Industrial Complexities. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379435_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379435_22
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