Abstract
The prescriptive implications of the sort of abstract theorizing discussed in the last chapter were perplexing to many. In one sense they were quite radical in that they suggested a totally new approach to strategy and dealings with a potential enemy. In another sense they were extremely conservative because they took the status quo as a given, and devoted their energies to its preservation. Little hope was offered that the East-West conflict might be resolved either by political or military means. Their analyses yielded neither new ideas on how to achieve a political accommodation with the Soviet Union nor military concepts that opened up the prospect of victory.
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Notes
C. W. Sherwin, ‘Securing peace through military technology’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (May 1956). A short piece by Amster entitled ‘Design for deterrence’, was appended. The original Amster study appeared as A Theory for the Design of a Deterrent Air Weapon System (San Diego, Calif.: Convair Corporation, 1955). For evidence of the influence of Amster/Sherwin see Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 7
and Arthur Lee Burns, ‘Disarmament or the balance of terror’, World Politics, xii:1 (October 1959), p. 134.
Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1961).
Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. xiv.
Robert Osgood, ‘Stabilizing the military environment’, American Political Science Review, LV:1 (March 1961).
Malcolm Hoag, ‘On stability in deterrent races’, World Politics, xiii:4 (July 1961), p. 522.
The term is taken from Thomas Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace, (Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1960), p. 28. Murray, a catholic member of the Atomic Energy Commission, attempted more than most others connected with the nuclear programme to inject a moral element into the debate. A discussion of a variety of ethical problems is found in Green, Deadly Logic, chap. 6. Green also provides a useful bibliography. Green’s ideas are discussed, unsympathetically,
in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
See also Sydney Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints in Warfare (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowley, ‘Future trends in warfare’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (February 1960), p. 13.
Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler, Tail-Safe (London: Hutchinson, 1963);
Sidney Hook, The Tail-Safe Fallacy (New York, Stein & Day, 1963).
Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).
Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Practical consequences of the theoretical study of defence policy’, Public Administration Review, xxv (March 1965). Reprinted in The Revolt Against the Masses (New York: Basic Books, 1971).
Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on misperception’, World Politics, xx (April 1968), p. 455.
On the British campaign see Christopher Driver, The Disarmers (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964).
Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London: John Calder, 1958).
Leo Szilard, ‘Disarmament and the problem of peace’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xi:8 (October 1955), p. 298.
Leo Szilard, ‘How to live with the bomb and survive’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, xvi:2 (February 1960), p. 59.
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© 2003 Lawrence Freedman
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Freedman, L. (2003). Arms Control. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230379435_13
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