The Eisenhower Doctrine

Abstract

One aspect of the Suez crisis which has so far gone unre-marked in this study, was the Soviet attempt to capitalize on the Anglo-French action by issuing threats of nuclear retaliation against the two should they fail to halt operations. While these warnings were pieces of pure propaganda, they no doubt served to underline in the eyes of the US Administration the extent to which the Soviets might reap the dividends of the discomfiture of the old colonial powers. In fact, the Suez crisis instigated a debate within the Administration as to what US response would be appropriate to prevent the Soviet Union filling what was then perceived to be a power vacuum in the region. The ‘Eisenhower Doctrine’ or ‘Middle East Resolution’ which emerged from this process was, however, to prove to be more effective as a piece of cold war rhetoric and posturing than as any meaningful contribution to the furthering of peace or stability in the region.