Abstract
The main point about the nationalization of the Suez Canal was that it was an issue perfectly formulated to drive a wedge between the United States and Britain in the wake of their respective reorientations of policy in March 1956. As has been suggested, aside from the broader strategic divergence between the two over the question of the promotion of the Baghdad Pact and of Iraqi leadership of the Arab world, they had come to subtly, but significantly, different assessments of the new approach to be adopted towards Nasser. British opposition to him was trenchant. Nasser was Britain’s enemy, and his designs had to be thwarted. If not, he would subvert Britain’s position in the Middle East, an area which, because of the importance of its oil supplies, was vital to national survival. The US, on the other hand, did not see Nasser threatening anything so vital. Certainly, his influence in the region was inimical, and his actions seemed to be profiting the Soviet Union. However, an important element of pragmatism still remained in the US approach to dealing with him.
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Notes
Kyle, Suez, p. 121; Dooley, H. J., ‘Great Britain’s “Last Battle” in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the Suez Crisis of 1956’, International History Review xi/3 August 1989, pp. 486–517; pp. 490–1.
Murphy, R., Diplomat amongst Warriors (New York, 1964), p. 386.
Carlton, D., Britain and the Suez Crisis (Oxford, 1988), p. 31.
Horne, A., Macmillan 1894–1956 (London, 1988), p. 422.
Nutting, A., No End of a lesson: The Story of Suez, (London, 1967), pp. 76–9;
Lloyd, S., Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London, 1978), pp. 157–63.
Fawzi, M., Suez 1956: An Egyptian Perspective (London, 1986), pp. 68–76.
Lamb, R., The Failure of the Eden Government (London, 1987), p. 221; Kyle, Suez, pp. 283–4.
Kunz, D., ‘The importance of having money: the economic diplomacy of the Suez Crisis’, in thuhai Louis and thuhai Owen, Suez, 1956, p. 218.
Adamthwaite, A., ‘Suez Revisited’, International Affairs 64/3, Summer 1988, pp. 449–64, p. 463.
Barnes, J., ‘From Eden to Macmillan’, in eds Hennessy, P. and Seldon, A., Ruling Performance (Oxford, 1987), p. 98. Barnes argues that while Suez altered public perceptions of Britain’s great power status, it had surprisingly little impact on Britain’s ability to act, even in the Middle East.
This concept as a tool for analysing Anglo-American relations was first developed in Reynolds, D., The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Cooperation (London, 1981).
Darwin, J., Britain and Decolonisation (London, 1988), p. 231.
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© 1996 Nigel John Ashton
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Ashton, N.J. (1996). The Suez Crisis. In: Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378971_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378971_5
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