Abstract
The two events which were to change the British attitude towards Nasser from one of continuing if rather more suspicious accommodation in the wake of the arms deal, to one of open and unremitting hostility, took place in Jordan. First came the failure of the December 1955 mission of General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to secure Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact. Hard on the heels of this humiliation, at the beginning of March 1956, came the sudden dismissal of General Sir John Bagot Glubb, commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion. Both events were bitter blows to British prestige in the Middle East and contributed to a major reorientation of British policy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Lucas, W. S., ‘The path to Suez: Britain and the struggle for the Middle East, 1953–56’, in Deighton, A. (ed.) Britain and the First Cold War (London, 1990), pp. 261–2.
Dann, U., King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism (Oxford, 1989), p. 26.
Dulles—Macmillan, 5/12/55, FRUS, 1955–57, XIV, p. 821. Scott Lucas indicates that: ‘the US, originally indicated it would not oppose Jordan’s accession but reversed its position when Nasser suggested that Cairo might consider secret talks on a settlement with Israel, provided other Arab states did not join the Baghdad Pact.’ (Lucas, W. S., ‘Neustadt revisited: a new look at Suez and the Anglo-American “alliance"’ in Gorst, A., Johnman, L. and Lucas, W. S. (eds) Post-War Britain, 1945–64: Themes and Perspectives (London, 1989), p. 186.)
In his more recent work, Scott Lucas refers to Macmillan’s telegram of 28/10/55, reporting Dulles’s supposed support for Jordanian accession, but does not explore its possible implications for Macmillan’s and Dulles’s strategy in the Middle East (Lucas, W. S., Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis, London, 1991. p. 68).
Abidi, A. H. H., Jordan: a Political Study 1948–57 (New York, 1965), p. 132.
Thorpe, D. R., Selwyn Lloyd (London, 1989), pp. 191–2.
Ambrose, S. E., Eisenhower the President (London, 1984), p. 316.
Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, p. 32. Heikal, M., Nasser: the Cairo Documents (London, 1972), p. 85, also argues that Nasser was surprised by Glubb’s dismissal, even believing it to have been orchestrated by the British themselves as a sign of good faith.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1996 Nigel John Ashton
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ashton, N.J. (1996). March 1956 and the Break with Nasser. In: Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378971_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378971_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39571-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37897-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)