‘Ground of Our Own Choosing’: the Anglo-Japanese War in Asia, 1941–1945

Abstract

The Malayan campaign was the most humiliating and significant defeat in British military history. Between December 1941 and February 1942 the outnumbered IJA killed or captured 139000 Commonwealth troops. Just 3500 soldiers of Nippon were slain. This debacle had many roots. For Britain, menace in Europe produced weakness in Asia, miscalculations of Japanese intentions and of British airpower led to underestimating the danger, pursuing policies which led Japan to attack with Britain unable to defend. Britain had greater military resources than Japan but, fighting a major war in Europe, could not be strong in Asia. Sending enough forces to Singapore to support a cautious policy of deterrence against Japan was possible but, instead, Britain remained weaker and more provocative in Asia than necessary. It thought that cautious Japanese statesmen, unlikely to risk attacks on both Britain and the USA, could easily be deterred from war. These attitudes involved mistaken views about British and Japanese airpower. British leaders believed Japan’s air forces were mediocre, and could throw little power against Malaya because they lacked forward bases and required most of their strength to match Soviet air forces; thus, even outnumbered two or three to one, it was felt that a few second-class British aircraft could defeat Japanese air forces and any amphibious assault on Malaya. Whitehall did not even send out the air force it thought necessary, assuming enough warning of danger to provide reinforcements.