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Part of the book series: Studies in Russian and East European History and Society ((SREEHS))

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Abstract

In World War II, the Soviet mobilisation of industry appears to have been more successful than the German. Yet in terms of prewar resources and ex ante mobilisation potential there is no obvious reason why this should have been the case. In production, resources, and mobilisation preparations there were many similarities. The obvious differences were mostly to the Soviet disadvantage. Yet the Soviet economy produced weapons on a larger scale than Germany, and more of Soviet war production came earlier in the war. How can this be explained?

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© 2000 Mark Harrison

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Harrison, M. (2000). Wartime mobilisation: a German comparison. In: Barber, J., Harrison, M. (eds) The Soviet Defence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev. Studies in Russian and East European History and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378858_5

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