Abstract
Central bank independence is now widely regarded as desirable. It is associated with low inflation, and low and predictable inflation appears to have effects on growth rates which, although modest year by year, build up to having significant beneficial effects on national income over longer periods (Barro, 1995). The idea that a central bank might be ‘too independent’ - quite aside from whether independence is a concept admitting of various ‘degrees’ - therefore may seem bizarre.
Nevertheless the question is worth pursuing. Doing so raises questions about the stability of the structure of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its relations with the European Parliament and national governments; and these questions in turn raise concerns about future economic performance in the European Monetary Union (EMU) area.
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Wood, G.E. (2001). Is the European Central Bank too Independent?. In: Hölscher, J. (eds) 50 Years of the German Mark. Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378551_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230378551_5
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