Abstract
As we have seen, the main thrust of the theory of cooperative games has been based on the concept of a solution, typically represented by a set of imputations, that is, distributions of some collectively achieved gain among the players. The sum of the payoffs defining an imputation represents the most the players acting as a grand coalition can attain. It follows that the principal concern of this branch of game theory is with conflict resolution. The solution of a game represents, after all, the resolution of the conflicts of interests among the players. In the context of a normative theory, a solution of a game (in the form of an imputation) is rationalized as satisfying certain a priori stated principles of fairness or stability.
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© 1998 Anatol Rapoport
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Rapoport, A. (1998). Theories of Coalition Formation. In: Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_20
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39988-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37776-9
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