Abstract
In Chapter 9 we examined two-person constant sum games with finite numbers of pure strategies. These games can be represented by matrices where the rows designate one player’s pure strategies and the columns the other’s. The number of pure strategies available to each player may be superastronomical (as for example, in chess) so that determining strategies by standard algorithms, such as the simplex method, is out of the question. Limits on the games that can be actually solved in this way need not imply limits on the theoretical conclusions valid for all finite games of a given type. The conclusions do not, however, necessarily hold for games with infinite numbers of strategies.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1998 Anatol Rapoport
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Rapoport, A. (1998). Some Topics in Continuous Games. In: Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_11
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39988-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37776-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)