Conclusion

Abstract

Britain’s trade relations with Europe, during the middle years of the Macmillan premiership, became a depressing and a vexing business. Cut adrift from old certainties, ministers struggled to steer a steady course in the wake of unprecedented\ cooperation between the continental European states. On this matter, far from setting an agenda of policies formulated to appeal to the party and the electorate, the government was forced into devising an acceptable response to the agenda of foreign powers. But this was no wartime situation when a beleaguered nation could be expected to rally behind its leadership; this was a time of peace and relative prosperity when expectations were high and electorates unforgiving. In the light of this, the difficulty that the government faced of reconciling the maintenance of Britain’s position as leader of the Commonwealth and player on the world stage with the more mundane demands of securing an economic accommodation with the Six was a well-nigh intractable one. Macmillan’s goal when he came to power was to arrive at an agreement with the EEC countries that fell well short of British accession to the Treaty of Rome. In so far as he was forced to revise that objective, his European policy could be said to have failed.