Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Western Europe between Soviet Threat and American Guarantee

  • Chapter
Book cover NATO, Britain, France and the FRG

  • 83 Accesses

Abstract

This was the premise of all defence planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as stated here in a ‘Top Secret Cosmic’ document (that is, hardly a public propaganda document but the foundation of serious planning) of 1954. By extension, the successive strategies of NATO have been reactive, defensive, and this is true also for NATO’s nuclear strategies. Both have been a function of the perception of a threat. The North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was signed in April 1949, and NATO with its integrated military structure was formed in 1950 as reaction first to a political, and then to a steadily growing military threat, perceived as emanating from the Soviet Union and its satellite states.2 While another power’s force superiority alone is no reason for fear, in conjunction with a political or ideological conflict it becomes a cause for concern. At the latest from 1949 (when it became clear that Stalin was rearming his satellites3) until the Treaty on the reduction of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in November 1990, NATO felt numerically inferior to the conventional forces of the Eastern Bloc. (NATO’s perception was acknowledged as valid by the asymmetric reductions conceded by Moscow in the CFE Treaty.)

As the initiation of a war by NATO would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the Alliance, it has been ruled out as a possibility. War, therefore, can come only as a result of Communist aggression….1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. For the switch from a mainly political and ideological to a military threat perception in 1950, see Robert Jervis: ‘The impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563–92;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. and for the European perspective, see Beatrice Heuser: ‘NSC 68 and the Soviet threat’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991), pp. 17–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Beatrice Heuser: Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–1953 (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 125–34, and Appendix C.

    Google Scholar 

  4. With the exception of the Netherlands, see Jan Willem Honig: Defense Policy in the North Atlantic Alliance: The Case of the Netherlands (New York: Praeger, 1993), passim.

    Google Scholar 

  5. See Beatrice Heuser: Nuclear Strategies and Belief-Systems: Britain, France and the FRG (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1998).

    Google Scholar 

  6. See for example Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed.): The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat (London: Pinter, 1990).

    Google Scholar 

  7. NSC 68, Section VIII. 3, printed in Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis: Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 416.

    Google Scholar 

  8. See Beatrice Heuser: ‘Stalin as Hitler’s Successor: Western Interpretations of the Soviet Threat’, in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill (eds): Securing Peace in Europe, 1945–62 (London: Macmillan, 1992).

    Google Scholar 

  9. Text in full in Alan Macmillan and John Baylis: A Reassessment of the British Global Strategy Paper of 1952 International Politics Research Papers No. 13 (Aberystwyth: University of Wales, Department of International Politics, 1993), pp. 58–89,

    Google Scholar 

  10. and in excerpts in John Baylis: Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945–1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 405–14.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  11. Sir Anthony Eden: The Memoirs Vol. III Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960), p. 554. Macmillan claims to have been convinced that ‘the Americans could not have failed to take part’ in a general nuclear war which ‘must have’ resulted from a Soviet nuclear attack on Britain;

    Google Scholar 

  12. Harold Macmillan: Riding the Storm, 1956–1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 165 — but see private British views on this discussed in Chapter 3. Concerning France, the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer remembered that the message of Bulganin’s ‘ultimatum’ was given to the head of the French government, Guy Mollet, during a dinner attended by Adenauer, and Mollet immediately had instructions sent to his ambassador in Washington to ask ‘about the status of the American security guarantee’. The ambassador was supposedly told by Herbert Hoover Jr. in the State Department that, in this context, the American guarantee did not apply;

    Google Scholar 

  13. Franz Josef Strauss: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1989), p. 107f. Adenauer himself and his government took Bulganin’s statement so seriously that it was debated in Bonn whether the German Chancellor should indeed travel to Paris on his scheduled visit;

    Google Scholar 

  14. see Wilhelm G. Grewe: Rückblenden: Aufzeichnungen eines Augenzeugen von Adenauer bis Schmidt (Frankfurt/Main: Propylaen, 1979), pp. 281–34.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Schroder: ‘Wie Westeuropa zu verteidigen ist’, Politische Meinung Vol. 13 No: 4 (1968), p. 14; ‘Weissbuch 1969 zur Verteidigungspolitik der Bun-desregierung’, Bulletin No. 25 (28 February 1969), p. 211.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Compare this with the threat assessment by NATO and the West German military before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example Wolf Graf von Baudissin: ‘NATO Strategie im Zeichen der Friedenserhaltung’, Europa-Archiv [henceforth EA] Vol. 23b No. 17 (1968), p. 637.

    Google Scholar 

  17. General Graf von Kielmansegg: ‘Warnings must be heeded’, Survival Vol. 10 No. 11 (November 1968), originally printed in Die Welt (24 August 1968); see also the FRG’s Government’s endorsement of this reasoning in Federal Ministry of Defence: Defence White Book (1969)

    Google Scholar 

  18. Georg Graf von Baudissin: ‘Europaische Sicherheit: Kriterien und Anforderungen’, EA Vol. 24 No. 1 (1969), p. 14f;

    Google Scholar 

  19. Walther Leisler Kiep: ‘Grundlagen der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik’, Wehrkunde Vol. 18 No. 2 (February 1969), p. 54f.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Denis Healey: The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989; this edition Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 309.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Harold Macmillan: Tides of Fortune: Memoirs, 1945–1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 622.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Johannes Steinhoff and Reiner Pommerin: Strategiewechsel: Bundesrepu-blik und Nuklearstrategie in der Ara Adenauer-Kennedy (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1992), p. 26.

    Google Scholar 

  23. Captain Sallerin: ‘Guerre future et armee de l’air’, Forces Aeriennes Frangaises Vol. 3 No. 16 (January 1948), p. 511.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Basil Henry Liddell Hart: Deterrent or Defence: Afresh look at the West’s military position (London: Stevens & Son, 1960), p. 40.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Colonel J. Calmel: ‘Le “deterrent” a-t-il change de camp?’, Forces Aér-iennes Frangaises Vol. 12 No. 133 (January 1958), p. 101f;

    Google Scholar 

  26. Herbert Blankenhorn: Verstandnis und Verständigung: Blatter eines politischen Tagebuchs, 1949–1979, (Frankfurt/Main: Propylaen, 1980), p. 287.

    Google Scholar 

  27. quoted in Michael M. Harrison: The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 76 and see note on p. 247f, after Harald von Rieckhoff: ‘NATO: Issues and Prospects’, Contemporary Affairs No. 38 (Toronto, Ont.: Canadian Institute of IA, 1967), p. 25 ff.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Pierre M. Gallois: ‘Berlin et la nouvelle politique de dissuasion occi-dentale’, Forces Aériennes Françaises Vol. 16 No. 177 (January 1962), pp. 95–114.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Lord Gladwyn: ‘The Defense of Western Europe’, Foreign Affairs [henceforth FA] Vol. 51 No. 3 (April 1973), pp. 588, 590.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  30. Lord Balniel: ‘European Defence and European Security’, translation of the speech printed in Wehrkunde, reprinted in Survival Vol. 13 No. 5 (May 1971), p. 169.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Alfred Frisch: ‘L’Allemagne entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union Soviétique’, RDN Vol. 20 No. 7 (July 1964), p. 1237 f; reactions to William Foster’s article in FA in the summer of 1965 were particularly strong, see ‘Bonn will keine nukleare Verfügungsgewalt’, Die Rheinpfalz; ‘Ausdriicklicher Verzicht auf Kauf von Atomwaffen unnotig’, Frankfurter Neue Presse; ‘Bonn beschwichtigt’, Rhein-Neckar Zeitung (all 13 July 1965); ‘Die aufregenden Plane Mr. Gilpatrics’, Rheinischer Merkur (14 July 1965); Adelbert Weinstein: ‘Bonn und die Atomwaffen’, FAZ (15 July 1965); William Foster: ‘Grösse und Elend der Atommächte’, FAZ (21 July 1965); ‘Bonn will bei neuem Atom-Abkommen nicht übergangen wer-den’, FAZ (24 July 1965);

    Google Scholar 

  32. see also Christoph Hoppe: Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands, 1959–1966 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), p. 271f; Pierre Roustide: ‘Apres l’accord de Moscou: espoirs ou illusions’, RMG No. 1 (January 1964), pp. 3–9; ‘Adenauer: Genfer US-Vorschläge gefährlich’, General Anzeiger (20 August 1965); Helmut Schmidt: ‘The future of Germany in a Changing European Context’, talk at the annual conference of the IISS in 1966, Adelphi Papers No. 33 (March 1967), p. 43;

    Google Scholar 

  33. Helmut Schmidt: Menschen und Mächte (orig. Berlin: Siedler, 1987; repr. by Goldmann, 1991), pp. 222–340 passim; Hans Werner Kettenbach: ‘NATO-Reform ‘die beste Art’ der Krisenbewältigung’, Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger (24 January 1980);

    Google Scholar 

  34. Franz Josef Strauss: ‘Manifesto of a German Atlanticist’, Strategic Review Vol. 10 No. 3 (Summer 1982), pp. 11–15; ‘Deutscher Atomverzicht — um welchen Preis?’, Die Welt-woche (30 July 1965); ‘Kein Verlass mehr auf Amerika?’, Der Spiegel (5 May 1975), coverstory;

    Google Scholar 

  35. Marshal A. Juin: ‘Que devons-nous penser de la sécurité française?’, RDN Vol. 13 No. 1 (January 1957), p. 16; Raymond Aron: ‘Un nouveau membre du Club’, Le Figaro (14 August 1959);

    Google Scholar 

  36. Pierre M. Gallois: ‘L’Alliance Atlantique et l’évolution de l’armement’, PE Vol. 24 No. 2 (1959), pp. 200–3; Raymond Aron: ‘Les relations franco-américaines: le centre du débat’, Le Figaro (12 May 1962); Paul Norder: ‘La guerre atomique n’aura pas lieu’, RMG No. 6 (June 1963), p. 121; Paul Pigasse: ‘L’illusion de la terreur nucléaire’, Revue militaire d’Information No. 353 (October 1963), p. 65; Maurice Schumann at the 5th annual conference of the ISS: ‘The evolution of NATO’, Adelphi Papers No. 5 (London: September 1963), p. 24; James Reston: ‘What do they think we are?’, New York Times (21 January 1963); General Andre Beaufre: ‘La strategie des superpuissances’, Stratégie No. 28 (October-December 1971), pp. 14, 20–1;

    Google Scholar 

  37. Denis Healey: The Race against the H-Bomb (London: Fabian Society, March 1960), p. 20; ‘Don’t forget Europe, Mr. Wilson!’, New Statesman (29 October 1965).

    Google Scholar 

  38. Laurence W. Martin: ‘Ballistic Missile Defence and Europe’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. XXIII No. 5 (May 1967), p. 45; Laurence W. Martin: ‘The American ABM decision’, Spectator (29 September 1967), reprinted in Survival Vol. 9 No. 12 (December 1967), p. 384; “Why so little remains of the special relationship’, The Times (4 January 1967); ‘Britain pressed to stay in nuclear race’, The Times (9 January 1967); William H. Stringer: ‘Antimissile threat’, Christian Science Monitor (26 January 1967).

    Google Scholar 

  39. Friedhelm Kruger-Sprengel: ‘Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik, Westeuropa und die Weltmächte’, Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung Vol. 4 No. 4 (1974), pp. 29–46.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Christoph Bertram: ‘European Security and the German Problem’, International Security Vol. 4 No. 3 (Winter 1979/89), p. 109;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  41. Lord Kennet: ‘Europe and Arms Control’, Survival Vol. XIX No. 3 (May-June 1977), p. 126; interviews with Whitehall officials; J.N.: ‘Les Etats-Unis et la défense de l’Europe’, RDNNoX. 26 No. 6 (June 1970), pp. 1005–17;

    Google Scholar 

  42. Jean Klein: ‘Les SALT et la sécurité en Europe’, Revue française de science politique Vol. 23 No. 4 (August 1972), pp. 843–58;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  43. Walter Schütze: ‘Un point de vue européen’, PE Vol. 37 No. 3 (1972), p. 305; Andre Fontaine: ‘L’avoir ou pas?’, Le Monde (21 August 1973);

    Google Scholar 

  44. Guy de Carmoy: ‘Force de frappe et défense européenne’, Revue poltique et parlementaire Vol. 75 No. 847 (December 1973), p. 54;

    Google Scholar 

  45. Pierre Hassner: ‘SALT, ou le triomphe de l’arms control’, Revue française de science politique Vol. 23 No. 4 (August 1973), pp. 781–9;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  46. Jacques Vernant: ‘Le “couple” et la crise’, RDNVol. 29 No. 11 (December 1973), pp. 103–9;

    Google Scholar 

  47. Jean-Louis Gergorin: ‘Les négotiations SALT et la défense de l’Europe’, RDN Vol. 34 No. 6 (June 1978), p. 56; Norman Gibbs: ‘The changing nuclear balance’, Financial Times (4 March 1970); Andre Fontaine: ‘Du faux Yalta au vrai?’ Le Monde (23 May 1972). See also: ‘La Nation reproche au “New York Times” d’être imprégné de Pesprit de Yalta’, Le Monde (19 July 1972);

    Google Scholar 

  48. see also Jean Klein: ‘Arms control, désarmement régional et sécurité en Europe’, RDN Vol. 30 No. 8 (August-September 1974), p. 67;

    Google Scholar 

  49. Jean Klein: ‘L’Europe et les relations transatlantiques a l’ère de la négotiation’, PE Vol. 40 No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 59–83 passim;

    Google Scholar 

  50. see also Jane Sharp: ‘Restructuring the SALT Dialogue’, International Security Vol. 6 No. 3 (Winter 1981/82), p. 152.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  51. Air Commodore D.W. Richardson: ‘European Security and the Atlantic Link’, RUSI Journal Vol. 120 No. 2 (June 1975), p. 59;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  52. see also Christopher Tugendhat: ‘Europe’s Need for Self-Confidence’, IA Vol. 58 No. 1 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 8, 10.

    Google Scholar 

  53. Henri Rossel: ‘La “guerre des étoiles”: un défi incontournable’, Revue Politique et Parlementaire No. 918 (July-August 1985), p. 44; Jacques Baumel: ‘Quelle defense pour l’an 2000?’, Revue des deux Mondes (October 1986), p. 64. See also Pascal Boniface and Francois Heisbourg: La puce, les hommes et la bombe (Paris: Hachete, 1986), pp. 121–36;

    Google Scholar 

  54. see also Alun Chalfont: Star Wars: Suicide or Survival? (London: Weiden-feld & Nicolson, 1985).

    Google Scholar 

  55. Pierre Dabezies: ‘Sicherheit in Europa aus französischer Sicht’, Wehr-kunde Vol. 25 No. 5 (May 1976), p. 231; see also Helmut Schmidt: ‘Arm in Arm mit den Franzosen’, Die Zeit (29 May 1987);

    Google Scholar 

  56. Christoph Bertram: ‘Europe’s security dilemmas’, FA Vol. 65 No. 5 (Summer 1987), p. 951;

    Google Scholar 

  57. Klaus Ritter: ‘Politische Perspektiven nach dem Washingtoner Gipfeltreffen vom Dezember 1987’, EA Vol. 43 No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 1–8;

    Google Scholar 

  58. Karl Kaiser: ‘Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten in der Welt im nächsten Jahrzehnt’, EA Vol. 43 No. 24 (December 1988), p. 704.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Christopher Coker: ‘Discriminate Deterrence and the Alliance’, Strategic Review Vol. XVI No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 51–9;

    Google Scholar 

  60. Alfred Dregger: ‘Nuclear Disarmament: Consequences for the Alliance — Perspectives for Germany and Europe’, Comparative Strategy Vol. 7 No. 4 (1988), p. 338;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  61. Wolfram von Raven: ‘Abgeschwachte Abschreckung’, Euro-päische Wehrkunde Vol. 37 No. 2 (February 1988), p. 69; General (Ret.) Gerd Schmückle and Albrecht von Mullen ‘Das Konzept der “Stabilen Abhaltung”’, (Stardberg: Max Planck Gesellschaft, April 1988), p. 2;

    Google Scholar 

  62. Cay Graf Brockdorff: ‘Eine konventionelle Waffe als Werk-zeug der NATO-Strategie’, Europäische Wehrkunde Vol. 37 No. 6 (June 1988), p. 314; Hans-Dieter Heumann: ‘Nationale Interessen und Sicher-heit in Europa’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte No. B8/89 (17 February 1989), p. 16;

    Google Scholar 

  63. Clay Clemens: ‘Beyond INF: West Germany’s centre-right party and arms control in the 1990s’, IA Vol. 65 No. 1 (Winter 1988/89), p. 61.

    Google Scholar 

  64. Walter Nielsen: ‘Zwanzig Jahre Nordatlantikpakt’, Aussenpolitik Vol. 20 No. 4 (April 1969), p. 208;

    Google Scholar 

  65. Kurt. Fischer: ‘Grundlinien amerikanischer Politik’, Wehrkunde Vol. 22 No. 7 (July 1973), p. 355;

    Google Scholar 

  66. Wilhelm Meyer-Detring: ‘Unsere Sicherheit nach Vietnam’, Wehrkunde Vol. 24 No. 6 (June 1975), p. 281.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Particularly the Reagan administration was widely seen in Britain, and of course not only there, as unnecessarily provocative. See David Owen: ‘A New Realism in East-West Relations’, RUSI Journal Vol. 129 No. 1 (March 1984), p. 3;

    Article  Google Scholar 

  68. Mary Kaldor: ‘The Non-Nuclear Alternative’, Catalyst Vol. 1 No. 2 (Summer 1985), p. 56.

    Google Scholar 

  69. The Eisenhower administration merely stepped it up, but was not its initiator, see Beatrice Heuser: ‘Covert action within British and American concepts of containment’, in Richard Aldrich (ed.): British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–51 (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 65–84.

    Google Scholar 

  70. For UK views, see for example Geoffrey Howe’s Speech at the Royal United Services Institute, 15 March 1985, printed in EA Vol. 40 No. 8 (25 April 1985), p. D221; Lawrence Freedman: ‘NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative’, NATO’s 16 Nations Vol. 29 No. 6 (November 1984), p. 18.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Michael Howard: ‘Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defence in the 1980s’, FA Vol. 61 No. 2 (Winter 1982/83), p. 315f;

    Google Scholar 

  72. Lawrence Freedman: ‘Limited War, unlimited protest’, Orbis, Vol. 26, No. 1, (Spring 1982), p. 100;

    Google Scholar 

  73. cf. Philip A.G. Sabin: The Third World War Scare in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 73.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  74. For the significance of France’s rallying to the Harmel Report of 1967, see Helga Haftendorn: Kernwaffen und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Allianz: Die NATO-Krise von 1966/67 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994), pp. 287–344.

    Google Scholar 

  75. John Mander: Great Britain or Little England (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963), p. 188.

    Google Scholar 

  76. See the Rockefeller Report, cited by General Gazin in ‘Vers une stratégie européenne?’, RDN Vol. 14 No. 7 (July 1958), p. 1096.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, UK

    Beatrice Heuser (Senior Lecturer)

Authors
  1. Beatrice Heuser
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Copyright information

© 1997 Beatrice Heuser

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Heuser, B. (1997). Western Europe between Soviet Threat and American Guarantee. In: NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377622_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation