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Abstract

Much of moral philosophy has involved debates between consequentialist and deontological approaches to the subject. On the former side are philosophers who evaluate each action by reference to the consequences or states of affairs which the action brings about;l on the latter side are philosophers who evaluate each action by reference to its accordance or disaccordance with entitlements and obligations that obtain irrespective of the consequences that will flow from our heeding of them. In the course of these debates, each side has not only sought to commend the merits of its own broad position but has also sought to expose the shortcomings in the position of the other side. of ten, the attempts to discredit either position have proceeded via the construction of scenarios in which the assailed position leads to ghastly results. Roughly as of ten, the discrediting proceeds through revelations (or putative revelations) of analytical shortcomings.

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Notes

  1. One of the relevant consequences is the action itself, however we choose to circumscribe it. For two recent collections of essays on consequentialism, see Philip Pettit (ed.), Consequentialism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); Samuel Scheffler (ed.), Consequentialism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). For some of the important book-length studies of consequentialism that have appeared in recent years, see Conrad Johnson, Moral Legislation: A Legal-Political Model for Indirect Consequentialist Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) (rev. edn); Michael Slote, Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). None of these studies has addressed the argument by Finnis which I criticize herein.

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  2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 112–20 (hereinafter cited as FE). Finnis also of fers some brief reflections on the ‘better to suffer wrong than do it’ maxim in his Moral Absolutes (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 47–51. Muller’s version of the anti-consequentialist argument was set forth principally in his ‘Radical Subjectivity: Morality Versus Utilitarianism’, 19 Ratio 115 (1977) (hereinafter cited as RS); that critique was briefly adumbrated in his ‘Comment: “Moral Objectives”’, in Stephan Körner (ed.), Practical Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 212, 220. For my purposes — indeed, for just about any purpose — the differences between Muller’s anti-consequentialist position and Finnis’s derivative stance are negligible. I have therefore chosen to concentrate primarily on Finnis.

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  3. Apology, 32c–e. I have used the translation in Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) (F. J. Church and Robert Cumming, trans.), 39. Finnis quotes from the account by Socrates in FE, note 2 above, at 112–13, and in Moral Absolutes, note 2 above, at 48. Muller quotes from it in RS, note 2 above, at 121. Several versions of the ‘better to suffer wrong than do it’ maxim appear in Plato’s Gorgias (at 469c, 473a, 474b, 475e, 508d–e, 509c). For a position similar to that of Socrates and Plato, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, 1138a28–b5.

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  4. Throughout this discussion, I shall not take advantage of a fact which Muller himself acknowledged: namely, the fact that the S Principle can be rejected outright and that it has indeed been rejected outright by some notable thinkers. See RS, note 2 above, at 116 nn. 7–8. Another great text that could perhaps have been cited by Müller is Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. XIV, ¶ 5. (For Hobbes, however, a person’s use of all available resources in a condition of war was not classifiable as wrong at all.)

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© 1999 Matthew H. Kramer

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Kramer, M.H. (1999). How Not to Oppugn Consequentialism. In: In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377493_3

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