Abstract
In the course of propounding an extensive theory of natural law, John Finnis declares that certain goods are self-evident. Among these self-evident values, the good of knowledge lends itself to a special argument — an argument directed against people who assail the ranking of knowledge as a good.1 Finnis maintains that anyone who seriously denies the goodness of truth or knowledge must contradict herself flagrantly in the act of putting forth her position. Skeptics therefore exclude themselves from participating genuinely in a debate over truth’s value. Although their self-disqualification never per se establishes the goodness of knowledge, it ‘should persuade the sceptic[s] to cut short idle doubting’ (NLNR, 75; ‘Scepticism’, 267). Or so Finnis believes.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
The two main texts that advance this argument are John Finnis, ‘Scepticism, Self-Refutation, and the Good of Truth’, in P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Law, Morality, and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) (hereinafter cited as ‘Scepticism’), 246; and John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) (hereinafter cited as NLNR), ch. III. I should remark here that I felt obliged to write a critique of Finnis after I read Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, Postmodern Jurisprudence (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 4. I feared that the ineptitude of the chapter on Finnis by Douzinas and Warrington might give undue credibility to Finnis’s own stance.
As Shakespeare has Autolycus say: ‘Though I am not naturally honest, I am so sometimes by chance’ (The Winter’s Tale, IV.iv. 712–13).
I here develop a point made well though tersely in Nigel Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986), 66. 4. The bracketed words are Finnis’s, here and elsewhere in this essay.
John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 7.
In a different context with a different focus, Joseph Raz appears to adopt a comparable position: ‘[W]hatever people do they do because they believe it to be good or valuable, however misguided and even reckless their beliefs may be’ – Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 317. However, Raz then adds: ‘[T]h[is] principle is overstated … and has to be modified to allow for pathological cases’ — ibid., at 317 n. 11. For some exceedingly unpersuasive attempts to avoid such a qualification, see the discussions of akrasia in Books V and VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1999 Matthew H. Kramer
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kramer, M.H. (1999). What Good is Truth?. In: In the Realm of Legal and Moral Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377493_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377493_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41016-3
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37749-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)