Conciliation and Intra-Party Conflicts

Abstract

One clear implication of the ideas discussed in the preceding two chapters is that there exists an inevitably close connection between the constraints existing for decision-makers at the level of intra-party politics and the opportunities available at the level of inter-party interaction. These two environments provide a clear illustration of Robert Putnam’s two level game model and so the nature - and likely impact - of any conciliatory gesture will be affected by both sets of conditions rather than by a single, isolated environment. Often the interaction between these two levels will present major dilemmas to the parties involved. For example, the more focused or ‘closed’ a planned gesture, and the more privately it will be conveyed, the less the potential risks of elite or constituency protest for leaders of the initiating party, but the more revocable and deniable it is likely to appear to the leaders of the target. On the other hand, the more open the gesture, the greater its likely impact on the target and the less its deniability, but the more likely it is to be seen (at least initially) as a propaganda ploy to influence the initiator’s pro-negotiation public opinion or to undermine the target’s rank-and-file support.¹ The dilemmas of dealing with intra-party constraints in order to send precisely the right signal are constant and considerable.

‘Leaders’ victories and defeats are not always victories and defeats for their underlings. There have even been cases where a defeat proved a victory for the underlings’

Bertold Brecht Mother Courage and her Children