The Global Commons



As was shown in the preceding chapters, the environmental and developmental agendas are linked, not only at the institutional level, as in the UNCED agenda of 1992, or in consequence of the debt burden, but in everyday and obvious ways by the overwhelming impact of mass poverty on the ability of any society to maintain environmental standards that are taken for granted by the industrial powers. The explicit attempt to link the developmental and environmental agenda at UNCED was not new. The linkage reflected an attempt by the Third World countries to revive the debate on development that had failed by the 1990s.


Carbon Dioxide Emission Ozone Layer Coastal State Outer Space Exclusive Economic Zone 
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  1. 1.
    Quoted by Clyde Sanger, Ordering the Oceans (Zed, 1986), p. 158.Google Scholar
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    Sanger, op. cit., p. 158.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Mark F. Imber 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of St AndrewsUK

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