The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

Abstract

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was the first major foreign policy crisis of the post-Cold War era for the United States (see Table 5.1). Largely catching the White House unaware, the Iraqi invasion was less of a surprise to regional experts or intelligence analysts within the Administration (Little, 2002; Freedman, 1993; Miller and Mylorie, 1990). The attack came on the heels of months of verbal provocations directed at Kuwait and the other Gulf states by Saddam Hussein (most notably at the Arab League summit in May 1990), including accusations of ‘economic warfare’ through the overproduction of oil (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2001). The tensions between Iraq and Kuwait were particularly acute, and prompted by longstanding discord between the two states concerning territorial claims, allegations of ‘horizontal drilling’ in the Rumaila oil fields by Kuwait, and the terms and conditions surrounding the repayment of loans extended by Kuwait to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (Diamond, 1996). The Iraqi assault, launched the day after Kuwait’s rejection of Iraqi demands for transfer of the Bubiyan and Warba islands, followed a mass mobilization of forces on 23 July and culminated in the occupation of the emirate within six hours (ibid.).