Conclusion

Abstract

From the end of October to December 1962, the last vestiges of the Cuban missile crisis dissolved. One thorny issue, created by Castro’s refusal to permit UN officials on Cuban soil, was the provision of adequate inspection for the monitoring of the withdrawal of the missiles. That dilemma was resolved when Moscow agreed to discard the tarpaulins covering the weapons on the ships returning to the Soviet Union, thereby making it a simple matter for American U-2 planes to photograph the missiles on the departing vessels. The question of which Soviet weapons were to be regarded as offensive was another problem. Reversing the position he had taken in the ExComm meeting on 28 October, Kennedy began to argue that the IL-28 bombers were offensive weapons and so had to be removed. When Khrushchev acceded to that demand and forced Castro to go along with it as well, JFK announced on 20 November that he would end the naval blockade. The Soviets withdrew all their IL-28s by 6 December. In this way, the settlement to the crisis over Cuba, forged by Kennedy and Khrushchev at the end of October, was implemented.¹