Abstract
For many years, historians had been forced to speculate on the motives behind Nikita Khrushchev’s decision in spring 1962 to deploy offensive, surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba. Apart from Khrushchev’s own memoirs, the evidence was scant. But with the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev and glasnost, all that appeared to change. Former Soviet officials, some who played a role in the events of 1962 and others who were intimate with those who participated, have recently furnished long-starved students of the missile crisis with their version of events. This has undoubtedly been helpful in reconstructing the Soviet side of the story.1
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Notes and References
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© 1996 Mark J. White
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White, M.J. (1996). Nikita Khrushchev and the Decision to Deploy. In: The Cuban Missile Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374508_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374508_3
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