Conclusion

Abstract

Admiral Chatfield arrived at the Admiralty in January 1933 with a clearly defined policy aim. The First Sea Lord believed that the preservation of the Empire and the security of Britain’s rank as the leading global power and maritime trading nation depended upon its fleet. He desired to make the fleet equal to this task. Chatfield and his staff, however, were acutely aware that British sea power had entered a period of vulnerability. This was the legacy of the 1930 London Naval Treaty and the economic depression. The former had delayed until 1936 the capital ship replacement plan that the Admiralty had expected to begin in 1930, and the latter had wrecked a sizeable portion of Britain’s contract-starved shipbuilding industries. Despite the damage, Britain still possessed the world’s greatest building capacity. Yet that capacity would not be large enough until the early 1940s to replace the old battle fleet and, concurrently, to check determined challenges from its principal rivals.¹