Abstract
The Anglo-German Declaration of September 1938 did not bring about the change in relations with Germany that both Chamberlain and the Naval Staff desired. The collective sense of relief in Whitehall brought about by Chamberlain’s novel shuttle diplomacy was short lived. Hitler proved unresponsive to friendly overtures. Profound indignation at having suffered an unseemly humiliation swelled inside and outside the British policy elite. Intelligence from the Nazi camp was often terrifying. In succeeding months, the balance in policy tilted to containment, which was inaugurated in March 1939 with the guarantee to Poland. Concurrently, Admiral Chatfield’s successor struggled to adapt Admiralty strategy to match the post-Munich landscape.
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Notes
Pratt, Malta, examines Backhouse’s Italy-first offensive in the context of Britain’s Mediterranean policy. J. Pritchard, Far Eastern Influences Upon British Strategy Towards the Great Powers, 1937–39 (New York, 1987), looks at the Mediterranean-first policy in terms of the Singapore strategy.
Marder, Old Friends, 32; Admiral James to Roskili, 21 May 1969, Roskill [Papers CCC]7/196; ‘Senior Admirals’, n.d., n.s., in DUFF2/12; Admiral A. Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London, 1951), 195.
Watt, How War Came, 30–45; G. Weinberg, Germany. Hitler, and World War 11 (Cambridge, 1995), 109–120; Cabinet, 17 September 1938, 39(38), CAB23/95.
Watt, How War Came, 90–108; W. Wark, ‘Something Very Stern: British Political Intelligence: Moralism and Grand Strategy in 1939’, Intelligence and National Security 5 (1990);
J. Ferris, “‘Indulged In All Too Little”?: Vansittart, Intelligence, and Appeasement’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 6 (1995);
B. Strang, ‘Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, Sir Nevile Henderson and British Foreign Policy, 1938–39’. Diplomacy and Statecraft 5 (1994).
D. C. Watt, ‘Misinformation, Misconception, Mistrust: Episodes in British Policy and the Approach of War, 1938–1939’, in M. Bentley and J. Stevenson, eds, High and Low Politics in Modern Britain (Oxford, 1983); cf. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 245–59, 290–5.
D. Lammers, ‘From Whitehall After Munich: The Foreign Office and The Future Course of British Policy’, Historical Journal 16 (1973).
Historians agree that there was a shift in influence in Cabinet after Munich from Chamberlain to Halifax: see A. Roberts, ‘The Holy Fox’: A Biography of Lord Halifax (London, 1991), and
J. Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (London, 1989), for differing emphasis.
R. Cockett, Twilight of Truth (London, 1989). 85–6.
N. Chamberlain, The Struggle For Peace (London, 1939), 369–78; Cadogan, Dairies, 129–31
Churchill devised his own offensive plans before becoming First Lord: ‘Memorandum of Sea-Power’ PREMI/345. On ‘Catherine’ and interdicting Swedish iron ore: P. Salmon, ‘Churchill, the Admiralty and the Narvik Traffic, September-November 1939’, Scandinavian Journal of History 4 (1979);
T. Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of the Phoney War (Stockholm, 1981); Lambert, ‘Seapower’, 98–9.
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© 1998 Joseph A. Maiolo
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Maiolo, J.A. (1998). The End of Appeasement and the Bid to Transform Admiralty Strategy, 1938–39. In: The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374492_8
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