Abstract
As 1937 drew to a close, it became apparent in London and Berlin that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement had failed to fulfil the variety of divergent expectations that had originally made it possible. In the interval between the first exchange of notes in June 1935 and the second accord of July 1937, naval armaments diplomacy remained at the periphery of Anglo-German relations; the protracted bargaining neither facilitated a comprehensive resolution to the European crisis, nor did it bring about an Anglo-German alliance. Briefly, however, in September 1938, the 1935 Naval Agreement would again move into the foreground of Anglo-German relations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
M. Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford, 1984), 140–72.
DGFP D, I, No. 19; Dülffer, Marine, 299, 446 — 51; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, II, 35–41; J. Wright and P. Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Hoßbach Memorandum’, Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 42 (1987).
Hankey, 21 December 1936, MO(36)10, CAB63/51; D. Dilks, ‘“The Unnecessary War”? Military Advice and Foreign Policy’, in A. Preston, ed., General Staffs and Diplomacy (London, 1978).
See Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power; D. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War (Princeton, 1980).
K. Middlemas, Diplomacy of Illusion (London, 1972), Chs II-IV; Watt, How War Came, 76–87, and his Personalities and Appeasement;
C. MacDonald, ‘Economic Appeasement and the German “Moderates” 1937–1939’, Past and Present 56 (1972);
A. Crozier, Appeasement and Germany’s Last Bid for Colonies (London, 1988).
A. Best, Britain, Japan and Pearl Harbor (London, 1995), 1–60;
M. Murfett, Fool-Proof Relations (Singapore, 1984).
S. Toyama, ‘The Outline of the Armament Expansion of the Imperial Japanese Navy During the years 1930–41’, Revue Internationale D’Histoire Militaire 73 (1991); Phillips, 21 and 31 January 1938, PD06563/37, ADM116/3735; CID, 306th mtg, 13 January 1938, CAB2/7. Protocols establishing the new limits between the 1936 London Treaty powers, Germany, Russia and eventually Italy, were signed in June and July 1938.
Weinberg, II, 313–77; D. C. Watt, ‘Hitler’s Visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli’, Journal of Contemporary History 9 (1974); Deist Germany, 641–55.
Compare the record of the 15 September 1938 talks by Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter, in C11970/11169/18, FO371/21785, with Chamberlain’s account in C10084/1941/18, FO37I/21738; Cabinet, 17 September 1938, 39(38). CAB23/95; W. Strang, Home and Abroad (London, 1956), 146–7.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1998 Joseph A. Maiolo
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Maiolo, J.A. (1998). The Naval Staff and Defence and Foreign Policy, 1937–38. In: The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–39. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374492_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230374492_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40444-5
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37449-2
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)