Abstract
When Secretary of State Marshall offered American economic assistance for the reconstruction of Europe, the Spanish economic authorities encountered the utmost difficulty in financing their planned program of imports. The country’s reserves were declining, especially rapidly in 1947. The deficit in current account, which was expected to diminish in 1947, increased with a direct negative impact on foreign currency reserves. The postwar export boom, if there had ever been one to speak of, slowed its pace during 1946 and died along the first half of 1947. The Minister of Industry and Commerce described the lack of foreign currency reserves to pay for imports as Spain’s ‘main problem’ in July 1947.1 The Minister declared the need to increase existing resources threefold so as to enable the reconstruction and modernization of the national economy.
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Notes
G. Fodor, ‘Perché nel 1947 l’Europa ebbe bisogno del Piano Marshall?’, Rivista di Storia Economica, n.s., vol. 2 /1 (1985) 89–123.
E.K. Keefe et al., Area Handbook for Spain (Washington DC, 1976) 275; and AHBE, box 3: C/P, 1 June 1948.
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© 1998 Fernando Guirao Piñeyro
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Guirao, F. (1998). Spain’s Limited Financial Resources. In: Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–57. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373914_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373914_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40270-0
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